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CONTRACTS-ATTORNEY'S RECOVERY FOR DISCHARGE
WITHOUT CAUSE
Plaintiff, an attorney, was hired by C on a written contract for
$750 to defend C in a divorce suit by D, C's wife. Litigation was
far more involved than had been anticipated, the trial lasting
29 days. At the close of the trial, but before final judgment, C
told plaintiff he was dissatisfied with him and wished to discharge
him at once. Plaintiff said he was prepared to complete the case
and appeal, but if C discharged him he expected the reasonable
value of his services, equivalent to the fee of D's lawyer. C had
paid plaintiff $450, and replied that he would not pay "a cent
more." C then discharged plaintiff and has since died. Plaintiff
sued C's estate in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his
services. The trial court found the reasonable value to be $5,000,
but held that plaintiff's only remedy was damages on the contract,
which he had failed to plead. The California District Court of
Appeal in 265 P. 2d 926 (1954) said that whether the contract
had been rescinded was a question of fact and reversed for a
finding thereon. On appeal to the Supreme Court of California,
held (in a 5-2 decision) for plaintiff for $300. Oliver v. Camp.
bell,. ..... Cal ....... ,273 P. 2d 15 (1954).
The higher court said that one injured by the breach of a con-
tract may (1) treat the contract as rescinded and recover the
reasonable value of his services in quantum meruit; (2) keep
the contract alive by remaining at all times ready and able to
perform; or (3) sue for the profits he would have realized under
the contract as damages for the breach. One who has partially
performed under a contract of employment and is prevented from
further performance by the principal may recover the reasonable
value of services rendered, even if that exceeds the full amount
he would have received under the contract. The compensation
fixed in the contract may be used as evidence in determining
the reasonable value of the services, but it does not limit that value.
Although some jurisdictions limit recovery to the contract amount,
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the court said the better rule and the California rule is to allow the
real value of the services regardless of the amount named in the
contract. Since the contract had been breached and plaintiff was
treating it as rescinded, it was sufficient for him to plead only a
common count in quantum meruit, and it was not necessary for
him to offer to restore the $450, since he would be entitled to it
in any event.
But in applying these rules the court said that here the trial
was at an end and the plaintiff had virtually performed his obliga-
tion. The only thing still to be done under the contract was the
payment of a liquidated sum by C. Therefore, since plaintiff's
part of the contract was complete, the court held that he could
no longer recover on quantum meruit but only on the liquidated
debt under the contract.
The dissent fully agreed with the principles of recovery on
quantum meruit announced by the court, but said that they should
apply here. They argued that the contract included taking the case
to final judgment and appealing, which plaintiff clearly intended
to do. Thus the contract was not fully performed, and by the
court's own principles, concluded the dissenting justices, plaintiff
should recover $5,000. Cf. Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P. 2d 258 (Cal.
1935), where the court said the attorney discharged without cause
could recover the reasonable value of his services even if it was
more than the contract amount.
The question of whether an attorney's suit for fees under a
contract when he has been discharged without cause is based on
damages for breach of the contract or the reasonable value of
services rendered on quantum meruit has had considerable litiga-
tion in the more usual case where the contract value is the greater,
quantum meruit generally being allowed. But in the present case,
where the reasonable value is greater than the contract amount,
there is more uncertainty. See WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS, sees.
260, 262, 268, and 269. Since the two situations are essentially
the same, it would seem that on theory the same rule should apply
in each without regard to which amount is greater. Logically, if
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the contract is held to be rescinded by discharge without cause,
it is rescinded as to both parties and neither is bound by it.
In Re Montgomery's Estate, 272 N.Y. 323, 6 N.E. 2d 40, 109
A.L.R. 669 (1936), the leading case in the country on this point,
the New York court reasoned that since the New York rule was
that a client is not liable for damages on the contract when he
discharges his attorney, since he has a right to do so at any time,
so the attorney discharged without cause should not be limited
by the contract when the client is not. Lehman, J., dissenting,
argued that a client is not liable for damages on the contract be-
cause he is exercising a right in discharging his attorney, not a
mere power, and thus is doing nothing wrongful. But the attorney
should not be able to recover more than he contracted for when
he has done less work than the contract called for. Cf. Tillman
v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1935), where the court
indicated that the contract amount could only be used as evidence
of reasonable value and not to limit the attorney's recovery in
quantum meruit. However, some jurisdictions hold that recovery
cannot exceed the amount fixed in the contract. Breathitt Co.
v. Gregory, 25 K.L.R. 1507, 78 S.W. 148 (1904); Cotzhausen v.
Central Trust Co., 79 Wis. 613, 49 N.W. 158 (1891).
The leading case in Texas, Thompson v. Smith, 112 Tex. 634,
248 S.W. 1070 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923), reversing 233 S.W.
876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) which had held that the attorney was
limited to the amount of the contract, held that when an attorney
sued on quantum meruit the amount fixed in the contract was
"not germane" to the amount of his recovery. The court reasoned
that once the contract is breached it is no longer binding on either
party, and therefore the attorney may recover the reasonable value
of his services even if that exceeds the contract amount. Cf. Young
v. Tian, 150 S.W. 2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error dism.
where the court said that if both parties agree to abandon the
contract, there arises an implied contract whereby the client is




CRIMINAL AW: AIING AND ABETTING
In United States v. Moses, 122 F. Supp. 523 (E. D. Penn.
1954), a woman who introduced a pair of government agents to
a dope peddler, and who recommended the agents to the peddler
as safe persons with whom to deal, was convicted as a principal
in the subsequent sale of dope under 18 USC §2(a), as
amended October 31, 1951, which provides that "[w]hoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission," is a prin-
cipal to the crime, and punishable as such.
The court stated unequivocally that an abetter need have no
stake in the commission of the crime. This rule is followed by all
but one of the federal Courts of Appeal. The court of the second
circuit has followed an opposite rule.
In U. S. v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940), Judge
Learned Hand first enunciated the rule that a person had to have
"a stake" in the outcome of a crime before be could be convicted
as an abetter to such crime. In U. S. v. Di Re, 159 F. 2d 818 (2d
Cir. 1947), the court, again speaking through Judge Hand, said
at page 819 that "the prosecution must prove that the accused
had so associated himself with the principals in the sense that
he had a stake in the success of the venture," or he was not an
aider and abetter.
Judge Hand stated the policy behind such a rule by saying in
the Falcone case at page 581 that it is "especially important today
when so many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of
conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree what-
ever with the main offender. That there are opportunities of great
oppression in such a doctrine is very plain, and its only by pre-
scribing the scope of all such indictments that they can be
avoided."
The case most diametrically opposed to this doctrine, Backun
v. U. S., 112 F. 2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940), stated that "guilt depends
not upon having a stake in the crime, but on aiding the perpetra.
tors. Those who sell to criminals the means to carry on their
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nefarious undertakings, aid them just as if they were actual
parties to the crime, having a stake in the fruits of the enterprise."
In U. S. v. Harrison, 121 F. 2d 930 (3d Cir. 1941), it was said
that the doctrine had been modified by the court of the second
circuit in the case of U. S. v. Pandolfi, 110 F. 2d 736 (2d Cir.
1940) and the rule of the Falcone case confined to the particular
circumstances of that case. On the strength of this reasoning, the
third circuit refused to apply the test of a "stake in the venture."
The court was mistaken in its assumption, however, since the De Ri
case was decided six years later.
Most of the cases which have decided what constitutes aiding
and abetting have not mentioned the necessity of a "stake" at
all, but have applied the test laid down in U. S. v. Peoni, 100 F.
2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938), which is that the party must have "asso-
ciated himself with the venture in some way, participated in it as
something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to
make it succeed." Nye & Nissen v. U.S., 336 U.S. 613 (1946).
The U. S. Supreme Court has never squarely decided this issue.
The only case in point is Direct Sales Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 703
(1943), in which it said, "and there is also a stake in the venture,
which, if it may not be essential, is not irrelevant to the question
of conspiracy."
Judge Hand's statement of the public policy sought to be pro-
tected by his rule undoubtedly expresses a valid public interest.
Whether requiring a "stake" in the crime is necessary to the pro-
tection of that public interest, and whether it is the proper criterion
for culpability is more questionable. Furthermore, the phrase is
one which, as many other general "tests," lends itself more to
use as a statement of result than as an aid to a solution. At any
rate, the cases do not show that the use of, or failure to use, this





DEEDS: SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEMS
IN RECORDATION
S conveyed to P for consideration "all oil and gas and mining
leases, royalties.., located within the United States, most of which
are located within the states of New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Texas ... owned by S." P recorded in Scurry
County. Later S conveyed parcel in Scurry County owned at time
of execution of deed to D. Held: in trespass to try title action,
description in deed sufficient to convey all interests of S within
Texas, and when recorded in Scurry County, gave constructive
notice of P's rights as to all property within Scurry County. Texas
Consolidated Oils v. Bartels, 270 S.W. 2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954) error ref.
That a deed describing the subject matter as "all grantor's prop-
erty" or "all" in a given locality is sufficient description to identify
and convey property in Texas was early established and is consist-
ently followed. Smith v. Westall, 76 Tex. 509, 13 S.W. 540
(1890); Merrill v. Bradley, 102 Tex. 481, 119 S.W. 297 (1909);
Hatcher v. Stipe, 45 S.W. 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) error ref.
The general American weight of authority is in line with the
Texas view, see annotations, 55 A.L.R. 162.
Non-recorded conveyances are void as to subsequent purchasers
for value without notice. Art. 6627, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. 1925.
Record is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers for value
when the description of the property is sufficient to identify and
convey. Wilkerson v. Ward, 137 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911),
error ref.
Thus, under the requirement for sufficiency, the broad descrip-
tion to "all" property within Texas is sufficient to convey and to
permit constructive notice to attach from recording. But a problem
of some difficulty is encountered with regard to the place of re-
cording. Art. 6630, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. 1925, provides that "all
deeds... shall be recorded in the county where such real estate,
or a part thereof, is situated." If an instrument affects title to
several distinct or separate tracts of land which are situated in
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different counties, recording in a county in which some of the
tracts are situated is not notice with regard to lands not situated
in the county of record. Hancock v. Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex.
225 (1885). Recordation of the instrument in county in which no
part of the land is situated is actually worthless as to notice in
counties where the land actually lies. Adams v. Hayden, 60 Tex.
223 (1883); Huff v. State, 93 S.W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936). But when one tract is situated in two or more counties,
recording in only one of these counties is sufficient to give con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers in all counties in which
the one tract lies. Brown v. Lazarus, 25 S.W. 71 (Tex. Civ. App.
1893).
Notice by recording is imputed only to those persons who are
bound, under the circumstances, to search the record for such an
instrument. Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 216
S.W. 382 (1919).
A purchaser of one or these broad "all" grants would, at his
peril, have the burden of ascertaining the exact location of each
and every parcel and interest owned by the grantor, and recording
in each and every county in which such property is located. Failure
to locate and record a parcel in a particular county would open
the purchaser to dangers of new bona fide purchasers who would
cut off his title. One recording in a county would give the requisite
notice for any and all property of the grantor in that county. The
one exception would seem to be where one tract crosses county
lines, as in Brown v. Lazarus, supra. Thus it is manifest that such
a broad general description as in the main case is sufficient in law
to identify and convey, and thereby is sufficient to give construc-
tive notice when recorded properly where the land is situated.
Practical difficulties are encountered, such as the grantee locating
all the parcels, but under the settled law, once located and re-





FEDERAL INCOME-TAXATION-ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME-
GIFT OF AN OIL PAYMENT
Taxpayer in December, 1949, conveyed to a church by deed of
gift an undivided 1/8 interest to all his right, title and interest in
certain oil land until the total sum of $115,000 was reached. The
church sold this right to a third party who received the $115,000
during 1950. Taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction in 1949
(under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §23(o) or INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 170) in the amount of $111,925 (the fair market value
of the property at the date of the gift). The Commissioner con-
tended the gift was, in fact, an assignment of future income and
thereby taxed the oil runs to the donor in 1950 and gave him a
similar charitable deduction at that time plus allowances for
depletion. Held, the income accrued after the date of the gift and
the taxpayer was therefore entitled to the full deduction claimed
in 1949 as he had given the property and retained only a rever-
sionary interest. Nordan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C ----- (No. 137),
(August 31, 1954) (CCH Dec. 20, 535-1954; P-H T.C. 22,
137).
The Nordan case was based on a 1932 Board of Tax Appeals
case, Nail v. Cunningham, 27 B.T.A. 33, which held that an
undivided interest in oil property may be assigned and the income
arising from such property after the assignment is not taxable
to the grantor. The Nail case was undisputed until 1949 when
the Commissioner withdrew his prior acquiescence (1949-1 CUM.
BUL. 6) and held that such "short lived in-oil payments" were
assignments of future income (I. T. 3935, 1949-1 CUM. BUL. 39).
The Nail decision was based on the fact that under the law locally
applicable, such conveyance passed a property right, as the several
property rights embraced in a fee title may be severed and sepa-
rately dealt with, Stephen Co. v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113
Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1932) and such severance may be
accomplished by a conveyance of oil and gas in place, Hager v.
Stokes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927). Such reasoning
seems unwarranted in the light of the decision in Burnet v. Har-
mel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), where it was held that the bonus paid
for an oil and gas lease is ordinary income even though the local
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law treats it as income derived from the sale of a capital asset. It
expressly holds that, "state law may control only when the opera-
tion of the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary
implication, makes its own operation dependent on state law."
Therefore the decision in the Nail case, where only cases involv-
ing substantive law, oil and gas points were cited, seems to be
based on a weak foundation.
The Nordan decision expressly approve s of the Nail decision
and adds that cases where the right to receive income in the future
was transferred or where title to income producing property is
retained are not in point. Such reasoning was severely questioned
by the Commissioner as early as 1946, when he stated in G.C.M.
24849, 1946-1 CuM. BUL., that subject to certain exceptions, con-
siderations for "short lived in-oil" payments is ordinary income
and the fact that they are capital assets in the hands of the grantee
does not change the situation as ordinary income would have been
realized from the oil by the grantor had he not assigned the prop-
erty. In 1950 the Commissioner went all the way and stated in
I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CUM. BUL. 10 that all assignments of "in-oil"
payment rights, except those pledged for development, lasting
less than the life of the depletable property, are assignments of
future income. The Commissioner's contention was backed up by
judicial approval in Rudco Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, 82
F. Supp. 746 (C.C. 1949), where it was held that oil payments
granted by the taxpayer corporation to its stockholders in propor-
tion to their stock ownership were an assignment of future income
which was therefore taxable income to the corporation.
However, it must be pointed out that the consistent reasoning
of the fifth circuit has been to consider assignments of oil pay-
ments to be an assignment of a property interest rather than future
income. This is based in part on the fact that Texas substantive
law has long considered all oil and gas interests to be interests
in realty, Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717
(1915). This type of thinking which has been followed in both
the Nordan and Nail decisions has been sustained by the fifth cir-
cuit: in Ortiz Oil, Co. v. Comm., 102 Fed. 508 (5th Cir. 1939),
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affirming 37 B.T.A. 656, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 556 (1939),
where the grant of an oil payment was held to preclude the grantor
from taking depletion on that interest as the grantees had acquired
an interest to the oil and gas in place. In Lee v. Commissioner,
126 F. 2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942), the fifth circuit treated an oil
payment as property interests analogous to royalties even though
the proceeds from both are income rather than a conversion of a
capital asset.
By virtue of the Nordan decision the holder of oil and gas
interests may give oil payments to charitable institutions and
thereby receive increased total income after taxes. For example,
a married taxpayer with $300,000 oil income per year may give
a $50,000 oil payment and have $18,073 more after taxes than
had he not been so charitable. For taxpayers in lower brackets,
the same principle would give the donor $600 more after taxes if
he gave a $5000 oil payment out of a $70,000 yearly oil income.
These savings arise out of a "double deduction" which the tax-
payer gets, that is, (1) the oil payment would not be included in
gross income and (2) the gift gives rise to a charitable deduction.
(See discussion note following the principal case in 3 OIL AND
GAS REPORTER 1936.)
It is thought by this writer that the Nordan reasoning will be
reversed by the United States Supreme Court whenever the prob-
lem is squarely presented before that body. However it is sub-
mitted if this is not done, Congress will enact legislation analogous
to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (b)(1)(D) for property not
granted in trust. By virtue of this code section, the charitable
deduction is denied where property is transferred in trust with
the grantor retaining a reversionary interest which exceeds 5%
of the value of the property.
Walter P. Zivley, Jr.
1955]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW IOURNAL
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-REALIZATION OF INCOME FROM THE
DISCHARGE OF AN OBLIGATION PAYABLE IN FOREIGN FUNDS AFTER
DEVALUATION OF SUCH FUNDS
In Willard Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
214 F. 2d 815 (1st Cir. 1954) the taxpayer, a U. S. corporation,
financed purchases from a foreign vendor by borrowing pounds
sterling from a third party issuing to negotiable 120-day sight
paper payable in pounds sterling.
The taxpayer recorded these purchases in its books in U. S.
dollars based upon the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the
purchases were made. Subsequently, but prior to maturity of the
120-day sight paper, the pound sterling was devalued. This de-
valuation permitted the taxpayer in the taxable year in question
to discharge certain of these obligations payable in pounds sterling
with $84,047.36 less U. S. dollars than had been recorded in its
books.
The taxpayer, in its federal income tax return, treated the cost
of the raw materials purchased in the same manner as it had in
its books, but excluded the $84,047.36 from gross income. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the $84,047.36
was includible in gross income and determined a deficiency in the
taxpayer's income taxes accordingly. The case was tried in the
Tax Court upon stipulated facts. Inasmuch as the Commissioner
and the taxpayer agreed that the taxpayer's method of accounting
in costing the purchases was proper, the only question before the
Tax Court was whether the $84,047.36 was properly includible
in the taxpayer's gross income. The Tax Court sustained the Com-
missioner's finding and the U. S. Court of Appeals affirmed.
The question of whether income is realized upon the discharge
of an obligation payable in foreign funds had been before the Tax
Court several times, and its decisions are not easily reconcilable.
See B. F. Goodrich Co., 1 T.C. 1098 (1943); North American
Mortgage Co., 18 B.T.A. 418 (1929); Joyce-Koebel Company, 6




The Court of Appeals, after distinguishing Bowers v. Kerbaugh-
Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), an early Supreme Court deci-
sion which in the opinion of the Court of Appeals did not lay
down any clear-cut principle concerning foreign exchange, con-
sidered the case one of first impression. It then theorized that such
transactions in foreign funds could be treated taxwise in either
of two ways:
(1) The purchases and the discharge of the related obligations
to pay pounds sterling could be considered as a single integrated
transaction. If so considered, the cost of the purchases would be
the total U. S. dollars ultimately expended by the taxpayer in
discharging the related obligations, and consequently there would
be no income realized merely by the discharge of an obligation
in pounds sterling after devaluation.
(2) The purchases and the discharge of the related obliga-
tions to pay pounds sterling could be considered separate and inde-
pendent transactions. If so considered the costing of the purchases
would be based upon the rate of exchange prevailing at the time
such purchases were made and would not be affected by a subse-
quent devaluation of the pound sterling. A subsequent change in
the pound sterling would be a separate financial transaction giving
rise to income or loss upon the discharge of the obligation.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the taxpayer was governed
by the second method and therefore was required to recognize the
$84,047.36 as being within the "gross income" definition of Sec.
22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The fact that the
taxayer had costed its purchases with reference to the old exchange
rate and had stipulated with the Commissioner that such costing
was proper was considered as a rejection by the taxpayer of the
method permitting nonrealization of gross income. The Court of
Appeals considered that the taxpayer had put itself in the im-
possible position of asking to have the transaction treated both
ways in costing the purchases with reference to the old exchange
rate while recognizing the extent of loan to be repaid only on the
basis of the new exchange rate.
The Helburn decision may settle some of the conflict among
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previous Tax Court decisions by apparently giving the taxpayer
an election to follow either the single integrated transaction theory
or the separate.and-independent-transactions theory, but it leaves
unanswered certain questions. For example:
(1) What action by the taxpayer will constitute an election to
use either of the two methods?
(2) When will such an election become irrevocable?
(3) Must the taxpayer follow the same method for all foreign
funds or may he exercise the election as to each foreign fund
involved independent of his accounting treatment of other foreign
funds? This might be important where the exchange rates of
certain funds were relatively unstable.
(4) If the borrowed foreign funds are used for a personal
expenditure, should the taxpayer be required to realize income
regardless of elections permitted?
Taxpayers who resort to loans of foreign funds should care-




JURIES-THE EFFECT OF A WAIVER TO THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY
JURY ON A SUBSEQUENT TRIAL.
In the case of Spaulding v. Cameron, 274 P. 2d 177, (Cal.
App., 1954) the defendant, Cameron, undertook leveling opera-
tions on his property in preparation for construction. In doing this
he removed the tops of three knolls and cast the earth into the
mouth of an adjoining canyon. As a result of heavy rains, large
quantities of mud were washed down the canyon onto plaintiff's
property. The trial court awarded damages for future injury and
also granted injunctive relief. The Supreme Court remanded the
case with instructions to:
Determine on the basis of evidence previously presented and such
additional evidence as may be presented by the parties or not the
nuisance is in fact permanent.
Upon retrial, the defendant demanded a jury and was refused by
the trial court. Thus the California District Court of Appeal was
presented with the novel question of whether waiver of a jury
in the original trial precluded the defendant from demanding a
jury upon retrail, where, as here, the appellate court had not
reversed but simply remanded for additional determinations of
fact.
The court held that had the Supreme Court reversed the case,
then the parties would have stood as if no trial had taken place.
They would not be bound on a subsequent trial by prior waiver
of a jury.
The court further held that since the issue of liability had been
determined and the trial court's only duty was to determine the
type and amount of damages, which should have been determined
originally, the defendant would be bound by a prior waiver of
jury.
The first holding is in line with the majority opinion today. The
weight of authority is to the effect that, unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute, the waiver of a jury trial is applicable only to
that trial and does not affect the right to demand a jury on a
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subsequent trial after a case has been reversed. Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Van Dusen Harrington Co., 34 F. 2d 786 (D. Minn. 1929);
F. M. Davies & Co. v. Porter, 248 F. 397 (8th Cir. 1918).
The minority view, largely represented by New York, is that
having waived the right to a jury trial a party cannot retract such
waiver after reversal of the trial court by the appellate court. The
waiver remains good during the life of litigation. Laventhall v.
Firemans Ins. Co. of Newark, 266 App. Div. 756, 41 N.Y.S. 2d
302 (2nd Dep't. 1943).
Texas courts have been presented with this precise question
only once. In that case they held that, because of the strict consti-
tutional provision that the right to trial by jury shall remain invio-
late, and because of Art. 3061, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (now rule
216, TEX. RULES CIv. PRoc.), the right to a jury would not be
affected by a prior waiver. E. L. Dunlap v. Brooks & Case, 3
Willson. 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1888).
It should be borne in mind, however, that the novel question
before the California court was not as to the effect of a jury waiver
if the appellate court reversed the case. The question seems well
settled. It was as to the effect of a prior jury waiver if the appellate
court only remanded the case to the trial court in order that it
might determine other facts necessary to the disposition of the
case. This issue has been before American courts only twice. The
first case was Park v. Mighell, 7 Wash. 304, 35 P. 63 (1893), in
which it was held that a trial jury having once been waived, a party
cannot demand a jury trial when the judgment on the report has
been reversed for failure of the referee to state items allowed and
disallowed, and the case re-referred for the purpose. The second
case was Raleigh Banking & Trust Co. v. Safety Transit Lines Inc.,
200 N.C. 415, 157 S.E. 62 (1931), in which the court said at
p. 64:
The hearing by Judge Daniels was for the purpose of finding addi-
tional facts, in accordance with the direction of this court. The waiver
of a jury trial at the first hearing continued in force until the final
determination of all matters involved in the proceeding.
(Vol. 9
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The California Court is in accord with the above two cases. It
would seem to be a safe assumption that when other courts are pre-
sented with this issue a majority of them will also recognize a dis-
tinction in the effect of a prior jury waiver when the appellate
court only remands for further proceedings rather than reversing
the case.
It is submitted by the author that Texas courts will not follow
this lead. TEXAS CONSTITUTION, Art I, § 15 states:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The legislature
shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to
maintain its purity and efficiency.
Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution contains the further
provision:
In the trial of all cases in the District Courts, the plaintiff or defendant
shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial
by jury...
In view of these two sections of the Constitution, TEX. RULES
CIV. PROC. rule 216 and the rather strong opinions of our courts
upholding the right of trial by jury, it is probable that Texas will




WILLS: EFFECT OF THE PRETERMISSION STATUTE ON THE
RIGHTS OF POSTHUMUS CHILD
Testator, father of six living children and fully aware of the
prospective birth of his seventh child, executed his will devising
all his real and personal property to his wife without any reference
whatsoever to the living children or unborn child. Testator died
38 days after executing the will, and the child was born a short
time later. Wife of the deceased brought action as executrix of
estate to determine the rights of the posthumous child of the
testator. Held, an intention to disinherit the child was implied from
the language of the will, and the Ohio pretermission statute was
inapplicable. OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.34 (1953), Spieldenner v.
Spieldenner, 122 N.E. 2d 33 (Ohio Probate 1954).
Sec. 2107.34 provides that a testator's will is not revoked by a
pretermitted after-born child, "but unless it appears by such will
that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit such preter-
mitted child," then such omitted child takes from the estate as if
such testator had died intestate as to the omitted child. Without
precedent within the jurisdiction, this court, in interpreting Sec.
2107.34, determined the testator's intent need not be expressly
written in the will, but that it could be implied from the language
of the will construed in connection with the facts and circumstances
surrounding the testator at the time of execution. Where the testa-
tor failed to provide for the six living children in the will and
believed that his wife would provide for all his children, the court
decided the pretermitted child had been disinherited.
The court resorted to the construction placed on similar statutes
by Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee courts, and relied heavily in
its opinion on an Illinois decision. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, § 192.3
(1951), Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E.2d 862 (1946).
The Hedlund opinion stated that testamentary intent was the con-
trolling factor; the intent need not be expressly declared, but is
drawn from the language of the will construed with circumstances
surrounding the testator when he made the will. Where the testator,
with living children at the time of executing the will, disinherits
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these children, little short of an express provision in the will for an
after-born child will be sufficient to give such after-born child a
share in the estate. Hawhe v. Chi. and Western I. R. Co., 165 Ill.
561, 46 N.E. 240 (1897), a landmark decision based on the same
facts as the Spieldenner case, concluded it was not reasonable to
believe the testator intended to exclude living children and not at
the same time exclude a child born to his pregnant wife after the
will was executed. Evidence as to circumstances surrounding the
testator was admitted, and the court concluded if the testator had
wanted to make any distinction between his children, he would
have inserted a provision doing so.
All American jurisdictions allow testamentary freedom in which
a parent can disinherit his children; therefore, pretermission
statutes have been passed to provide for unintentionally or inad-
vertently omitted children or heirs, and their application can only
be avoided by usage of proper language in the testator's will. The
statutes are of quite varied phraseology, and it appears impractical
to set out general rules as to their avoidance. See note 170 A.L.R.
1320 (1947). However, two broad groups are distinguishable -
the "Massachusetts" and "Missouri" types. The former type is
more frequently found and includes those statutes of Ohio, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Oklahoma. These pretermission
statutes emphasize and are primarily concerned with intent, and
create partial intestancy unless it appears from the will that the
the omission of the children was "intentional and not occasioned by
accident or mistake." GEN. LAWS OF MASS. c. 191, § 20 (1932).
Extrinsic evidence is usually admissible to determine the intent
in construing ambiguous wills under the "Massachusetts" type.
ATKINSON, WILLS 143 (1953). Where the will is uncertain as to
to the intention to omit children, the testator's intent may be ascer-
tained by interpreting his words in light of attendant circumstances
under which the will was made. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, Sec. 132
(1951), Dilks v. Carson, 197 Okla. 128, 168 P. 2d 1020 (1946).
All the "Massachusetts" type states listed above allow this
extraneous evidence. Where the omission is unintentional, and the
statute is applied, the omitted child takes an intestate share with
the beneficiaries contributing to provide such share.
1955]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The "Missouri" type, including Missouri, Arkansas, Oregon,
and Washington, involves a minority of states and is mandatory
in nature. Testator's intention to disinherit a child must be ex-
pressed in clear and unambiguous language. Unless the children
are expressly mentioned within the will individually or as a class,
the statute is applied, and such children take an intestate share.
The will is in effect construed as being unambiguous, and extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible to show that the testator had his children
in mind and intended to disinherit them. ARK. STAT. tit. 60-
119, 120 (1947), Yeates v. Yeates, 179 Ark. 543, 16 S.W. 2d 996
(1929); Mo. REV. STAT. § 468:290 (1949), Lawnick v. Schultz.
325 Mo. 294, 28 S.W. 2d 658 (1930).
Texas' pretermission statutes, taken largely from those of Mis-
sissippi, do not apply where the "surviving wife is the princial
beneficiary in the testator's last will.., to the entire exclusion, by
silence or otherwise, of all of said testator's children." TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. arts. 8291-93 (Vernon 1948 and Vernon, Supp. 1950).
Articles 8291 and 8292, infrequently litigated, concern after-born
and posthumous children when the testator has living children at
the time the will is executed. Article 8293, involving the situation
where the testator has no living children at the time his will is
made, and there are after-born or posthumous children, provides
the will shall be void unless the children die before reaching 21
years of age and without having been married. TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. arts 8291-93 (Vernon 1948 and Vernon, Supp. 1950), Hill
v. Jose§y, 259 S.W. 2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref., is a
notable decision holding that where Article 8293 applies, the
entire will is void and wholly inoperative subject to a contingency
that it becomes good if the pretermitted children die under 21
years of age and unmarried. Justice Norvell's dissent stated the
will is valid pro tanto as are wills under Articles 8291 and 8292,
and the shares of the beneficiaries are not affected as long as the
children's shares would not be hindered; the will is subject to pro-
bate as to the beneficiaries.
It is submitted that the Probate Court reached the correct result
in the Spieldenner case. Where the testator gave all his estate to
[Vol. 9
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his surviving wife, and failed to provide for his living children,
sound reasoning shows that the testator intended to disinherit his
posthumous child in the belief that his wife would provide for the
welfare and needs of all his children.
Larry E. Golman

